ࡱ;   !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ACDEFH  FMicrosoft Word-Dokument MSWordDocWord.Document.89q' [\\؞$a$1$*$A$3B*OJQJCJmH sH KHPJnH ^JaJ_HtHBA@BAbsatz-StandardschriftartBBAbsatz-StandardschriftartHHWW-Absatz-StandardschriftartJJWW-Absatz-Standardschriftart1L!LWW-Absatz-Standardschriftart11N1NWW-Absatz-Standardschriftart111PAP WW-Absatz-Standardschriftart1111RQR!WW-Absatz-Standardschriftart11111TaT"WW-Absatz-Standardschriftart111111VqV#WW-Absatz-Standardschriftart1111111XX$WW-Absatz-Standardschriftart11111111ZZ%WW-Absatz-Standardschriftart111111111<<Default Paragraph Font&& Footer Char&& page numberFUF Internet c B*phmHsH>*nH_HtH::apple-converted-space<<h x$OJQJCJPJ^JaJ B cke x/Rh!^J6"6h~{ "xx $CJ6^JaJ] 2 vU_# $^JHBHList Paragraph$^]`& R&u% ! $bFhQ[&  q >dtu!<VVj}~0&fvwxyz{|}~ !!@ @(    HuuC"   HuuC"  0(  N s *q( T( T_GoBackY1qY1qqqP GTimes New Roman5Symbol3&ArialGTimes New Roman7CambriaI&Arial Unicode MS)5Tahoma5TahomaChAF~Hq ;;~Hq ;;'0Oh+'0 PXp Sylvie Rockmore Normal.dotmSylvie Rockmore92@I @@jo@+՜.+,D՜.+,M 0fCaolan80 6q tv l>R8L5    K X  @R("  Hegelian interpretations of Marx Marx is a great thinker, according to some criteria one of the most important modern thinkers. One of the characteristics of an important thinker is the ability to speak to successive generations. My aim here is to examine what Marx has to say to us now on the philosophical level. The reception of Marx varies greatly over time. The disappearance of the Soviet Union has strongly influenced the intellectual fortunes of Marx and Marxism. In the wake of the break up of the Soviet Union, the reception of Marxism has been enormously transformed from a nearly obligatory reference after the publication in the West of Marx s Paris Manuscripts quickly leading to a so-called humanist interpretation of Marx beginning in the 1950s to the current, almost total neglect. Except for China, where Marxism is still solidly entrenched, it still remains an intellectual force or at least an obligatory reference in only a few obscure corners of the world. Marx s scope is very wide. It is a truism to say that he has influenced an enormous span of fields. My approach here will be philosophical for two reasons. First, I am a trained philosopher. Second, I am convinced that the philosophical dimension of his position, which is also its least known aspect, especially as concerns Marxists, but also with respect to his critics or those who are simply neutral regarding his thought, is perhaps its most significant aspect. This is not surprising, since a long, sometimes a very long period is required to understand a really original thinker. A really innovative theory, idea or position cannot be understood immediately, hence cannot be grasped during the thinker s lifetime. One way to understand the history of philosophy is as an ongoing effort to grasp the views of a few important thinkers, who innovate in breaking with the ongoing debate, for instance, in establshing new and/or different criteria, and in general in transforming the discussion. A single example will suffice. About two centuries after Kant passed from the scene, we still do not comprehend even the general lines of the critical philosophy. In other words, the interpretation of an important body of thought is never ever simple nor rapid. I believe Marx belongs to this small group for whom more than a superficial understanding of their theories requires not only important effort but also much time. With this in mind, my aim here is to prepare the way to recuperate Marx s philosophy in rereading the relation of Marx to Hegel in a more neutral, non-Marxist manner. I am convinced that this relation is crucial to understand Marx, but that it is equally crucial to avoid a Marxist approach. Let me explain. My intention is to circumscribe Marx s contribution through reading his theory differently. The idea of recuperating an author, a position, a perspective, and so on is certainly familiar enough. In our time, Heidegger is the foremost exponent of recovering prior theories, in his case the concept of being, though his effort to carry this out is certainly controversial. Let me begin from the present situation in rapidly evoking Chinese Marxism. I know a little about it since I have been going to China every spring to teach at the University of Peking for the last five years. I still remember clearly when in May 1968 many people in France said they were Maoist, certainly Sartre, but without knowing much or indeed anything about what was going on in China. At the time, China was fully engaged in the cultural revolution. This revolution still attracts Westerners who come to visit the middle realm. But after all that time in China I have still to meet a Chinese who shares that same enthusiasm, even if it is still dangerous to study the events that took place during that very dark period. Marx still rules as the official ideology in this vast country. In the university everyone is constrained to study Marxism in reading official manuals in place of Marx s own writings, but few are interested in such courses. Everywhere professors are deep at work in analyzing Marxism they are supposed to study but not to criticize, certainly not to criticize openly which might be dangerous for their careers. Western Marxism in all its numerous forms is almost unrelated, other than the name, to official Chinese Marxism and certainly to Marx s position. Western Marxism is now mainly dominated by Hegelian Marxism. I will come back to this point below. Since Mao knew almost nothing about philosophy, in China few who study Marx do it through Hegel, for instance through scrutinizing the relation of Marx to Hegel. This lacuna has still not been corrected. For the Chinese students of Marx and Marxism, the Chinese Communist Party makes the important decisions. It is hence not surprising that Jiang Ze Min, who preceded Hu Jintao, created four Marxist slogans, of which the fourth reads in translation: rich is good. This is a way of saying that in China as elsewhere, until recently Marx was in effective dead, dead at least on the intellectual level. He is still clinically dead in certains tradition, for instance in English-speaking countries, where the vibrant debate around Marx and Marxism in the middle of the last century has since completely disappeared. In the current English-language discussion, there is very little reference to Marx. Eminent researchers who formely worked in Marx and Marxism have since either left the scene or changed fields. I say this in spite of the renewed attention to Marx since the beginning of the great recession in 2008. In the face of the general indifference concerning his views, one wonders if Marx still has something to say, especially something philosophical to say. This is a variation on the pertinent question that Croce raised about Hegel about a century ago. I will try to respond in sketching several ideas drawn from a book I published about a decade ago on Marx and Marxism. I thought then and I still think now that after the collapse of official Marx, and Marxism in general, Marx could only continue to speak to us on the condition of going beyond Marxism. Several conditions for rereading Marx s philosophy Marx s position, which emphasizes the importance of the social context, also depends on it. His position, hence, cannot be indifferent to fundamental social change. The sudden, precipitous decline of official Marxism offers an occasion to concentrate on Marx s philosophical perspective. With that in mind, I would like to raise four conditions that must be met in order to get clearer about Marx s philosophy. These conditions concern: (1) Marxism; (2) Hegel; (3) political economy; and (4) the Marxian model of modern industrial society. In general, even the best students of Marx and Marxism either fail to distinguish, or fail to distinguish sufficiently between Marx and Marxism. An example among many is the German social thinker Jrgen Habermas, whose critique of Marx applies to Marxism, but not to Marx, though he does not distinguish them. It seems obvious that the best way to understand Marx s views is to read his texts. No one would dream of approaching Plato by reading the Platonists, or Kant in reading the Kantians. But this is reguarly done with respect to Marx. The second condition responds to the need to revisit the relation between Marx and Hegel. It should surprise no one that Hegel is not simply some one to whom Marx reacts. When Marx was beginning to formulate his ideas, Hegel was the dominant figure in the philosophical debate. It is hardly surprising that his ideas and Hegel s ideas are so often intertwined. Hegel is obviously a true philosophical giant, one of the very few, certainly one of the very greatest, but finally still only a philosopher. In stressing that Marx is after all a Hegelian, I do not pretend that Marx is only a philosopher, though the philosophical dimension is central, arguably more central than is often thought in his theories. It is not possible to isolate the philosophical dimension of Marx s position from its economic dimension. Hence a third condition is to see that the Hegelian influence on Marx is crucial for the critique that he directed against political economy. Unlike Kant, Hegel is a thoroughly historical thinker, historical from one end to the other. Marx, who is influenced by Hegel s historical perspective, applies it in his view that economics, despite what the economists thought then and still think now, is intrinsically historical. The fourth condition consists in seeing that the same historical perspective that determines the Marxian critique of political economy also determines his own theory of modern industrial society. I believe that the central idea of his conception of political economy is neither his theory of value, nor the theory of alienation, nor the conception of fetishism, and so on, but on the contrary his comprehension of the historical, hence transitory character of modern industrial society. In my view, one needs to meet these four conditions to be able to circumscribe Marxian philosophy. In what follows, I will limit myself to commenting on several Marxian philosophical ideas. If I am right, it follows that, since Marx is a Hegelian, his philosophical ideas can neither be deduced from, nor reduced to the negation of Hegelian ideas, on the one hand, and his position is finally not situated outside but rather within the immense Hegelian framework, on the other. Understanding Marxism How can we understand Marxism? Everyone knows that Lenin thought the Marxism was simply the system of Marx s ideas and teachings. Stalin understood Leninism as the development of Marxism in the imperialist era of the proletarian revolution in general and the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. We are already very far from Marx and Marxism in the form that it was invented by Engels. This confusion is easy to understand since: (1) Marx and Engels interacted frequently and closely over a period of more than forty years; (2) Engels texts are easy to comprehend, always easier to comprehend than Marx s, since the latter mainly wrote in the frightful professorial jargon of his period; (3) Engels notoriously stresses that Marx and he formulated a single position that they worked out together, Marx more than Engels; and (4), Marx is often considered, certainly by Marxists, to be an economist, whereas Engels presents himself modestly, it is true, still perhaps not modestly enough, as a philosopher. It is true to say that Marx and Engels share the same political perspective, but false and misleading to think they share the same or even a similar philosophical perspective. Marx, who pursued advanced studies in philosophy, held a doctorate in this discipline. Engels, on the contrary, who did not graduate from the Gymnasium, only studied philosophy sporadically. Since he lacked a solid philosophical background, his philosphical level never surpassed that of an amateur. However, generations of Marxists, who often do not possess an adequate philosophical background, continue to look for philosophical truth in his texts. In Materialism and Empiriocriticism, Lenin cites Engels hundreds of times but Marx merely once. In the same way as the positivists of the Vienna Circle, Engels is impressed by scientific empiricism. He says, for instance, that praxis and industry suffice to overcome the unknowable Kantian thing in itself. This well known claim, which was shocking for someone as orthodox as Lukcs, is doubly interesting. It indicates that Engels does not have even a minimal grasp of a fundamental Kantian concept he rejects. It indicates as well his unlimited faith in contemporary science to resolve even philosophical questions. Engels, who does not know the philosophical tradition well, conjures up what is finally no more than a schematic idea in borrowing from others. Like Heine he thinks that the philosophical tradition reaches its peak and end in Hegel. He is especially dependent on Fichte and Schelling. Fichte believes that one is either an idealist or a materialist, but one cannot be both. Schelling holds that the so-called negative philosophy illustrated by Hegel cannot understand existence. According to Engels, idealism comes down to earth in a movement from thought to being that it cannot comprehend; whereas materialism rises up from the real world it and it alone can finally know. In other words, idealism is incompatible with, hence cannot know, what materialism knows. Hegel, or perhaps Feuerbach, Engels is not clear on this point, shows us the way out of idealism to positive knowledge of the real world. In criticizing Hegel, Feuerbach presents an incomplete form of materialism, which is later completed by Marx. Engels philosophical analysis is perhaps unintentionally but clearly ironic. In borrowing his basic concepts from the great idealists, he tries to turn philosophy against itself, in short to leave philosophy behind while pretending to resolve the philosophical questions through Marxist science. After Engels, Marxism greatly developed. There are now many different Marxisms. Hegelian Marxism is distinguished from prior Marxisms by its grasp of Hegel, a grasp that for the first time becomes adequate to analyze the complex relation of Marx to this great German philosopher. It was always known that this relation is crucial to grasp Marx s theories. But no one before the emergence of Hegelian Marxism had ever possessed the necessary grasp of Hegel. Hegel is obviously a difficult thinker to read much less to master. Though Marx depends on Hegel, it is not clear how well he grasps Hegel s theories, certainly in his early writings, though he arguably made progress in that respect later on. Marx, who possessed a complete philosophical education according to the standards of his period, claimed to have mastered all of Hegel at the tender age of 18. Though he criticized the entire Hegelian position in detail in the Manuscripts of 1844, it is not clear how well he understood what he was examining. In comparison, however, the task of Engels, who was a philosophical autodidact, was infinitely more difficult. Engels, who speaks for both Marx and himself, suggests that in criticizing the Hegelian philosophy, their point of departure, they leave philosophy, which is merely ideology, behind, in adopting a materialist conception of history. This amounts to attributing an extra-philosophical, but supposedly materialist, hence non-ideological perspective to Marx. If the relation to Hegel is the key to understanding Marx, then, since Engels does not know Hegel well, he is not well situated to understand Marx, certainly not well placed to comprehend Marx s philosophical insights, hence not well positioned to grasp or to evaluate Marx s philosophical contribution. Engels situates his account on the level of the Marxist distinction between the true and the false, between science and ideology, between materialism and idealism. From this perspective, philosophers in general and Hegel in particular have their heads in the clouds. But Marx and Engels, or perhaps Marx only have their feet on the ground. There is, hence, a complete and perfect distinction between the two domains. For philosophy transmits nothing more than deformed reflection of society, which is itself deformed in the stage of capitalism. But supposedly scientific thought lying beyond philosophy penetrates beyond false appearance to grasp the truth. Yet the distinction between science and ideology is itself ideological. It is as incorrect to say that philosophy is ideological, hence false, as it is to pretend the every scientification affirmation is true. This simple description is also simplistic, in any case inadequate to comprehend either Hegel or Marx, or to grasp their relation. In order to grasp Marx on the philosophical level, we need to proceed otherwise. What should we do? Engels identifies a break, a rupture, or again a discontinuity between Marx and Hegel, between and science, and so on. Now the concept of rupture is difficult either to grasp or to defend. Philosophy does not and has never proceeded by jumps, nor by an epistemological break, but rather through the slow evolution of ideas, positions, and perspectives that are gradually displaced in favor of other possibilities. Consider, for instance, German idealism. There is nothing resembling a rupture between the great German idealists. They react to each other in displacing the debate underway. Yet none of them breaks with the preceding tradition, and none of them breaks with philosophy. How to reread Hegel in non-Marxist fashion It is indispensable, in order to comprehend Hegel, to scrutinize his relation to Kant. This relation is present on every page of Hegel s collected writings. There are many ways to read Hegel, whose theories arguably are already under way in his first philosophical text, which bears the mysterious title: Differenz des Fichte schen und Schelling schen Systems der Philosophie. We find here a Hegel very critical of Kant, but also very close to the spirit if not the letter of the critical philosophy. Hegel, who here adopts a very Kantian perspective, agrees with the author of the critical philosophy there can only be a single true system: the Kantian. Fichte and Schelling, Hegel s only contemporaries worthy of the name philosopher, offer variations on the Kantian theme, hence forms of Kantianism. In other words, Kantianism does not end with Kant but continues in the positions of the post-Kantian German idealists. How does Hegel understand the critical philosophy? According to Hegel, Kant s position is only authentic where it is speculative. Speculative philosophy culminates in the concept of identity, which is a form of Kant s brilliant Copernican insight. This is Kant s second and final approach to epistemology, after his rejection of what is often called representationalism. In simplifying, we can say that Kant advances not one but two incompatible epistemological approaches. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, he proposes a version of the familiar modern causal theory of perception. Instead of speaking of perception, Kant relies on the terms representation (Vorstellung) and appearance (Schein, Erscheinung). But despite the change in terminology, the basic epistemological approach remains unchanged. However, in the second edition of his book, Kant distances himself from this approach. In effect, representationalism does not and cannot explain how it is possible to know a mind-independent cognitive object, an object without a cognitive link to the subject. Kant proposes now, in place of the representation of a mind-independent object, that the subject must construct the cognitive object as a necessary but not a sufficient condition of knowledge. We find here what is often called the Copernican revolution, term Kant never employs to designate his position, but which others such as Schelling and Reinhold already employed while he was still active. The immense difference between these two conceptions of knowledge can be summarized as follows: instead of finding, uncovering or discovering the cognitive object, it is rather necessary in a way that Kant is unable to explain to construct, make or again produce it. With the exception of Schelling, who is a special case, post-Kantian German idealism generally follows the constructivist path opened by Kant. Hegel, for example, describes the epistemological process as running between the cognitive object given in consciousness and its concept, or the theory formulated to cognize it. The process of knowledge requires formulating a theory based on conscious experience, a theory which is then tested against further experience. There are only two possibilities: either the theory and the cognitive object correspond to each other, in which case the cognitive process has already ended; or there is a difference, in which case it is necessary to modify the theory, which in turn leads to a modification in its cognitive object. The post-Kantian German idealist theory carries the Copernican revolution beyond the critical philosophy it is concerned to interpret, criticize and reformulate. Post-Kantian German idealism can be regarded as an effort by different hands to complete the Copernican revolution in solving the problem of knowledge from an idealist perspective. Could it be that one of those caught up in the Copernican revolution is a so-called materialist? How should we reread the relation of Marx to Hegel? The relation of Marx to Hegel is complicated, more so than in Engels simplistic account. One of the difficulties lies in knowing what German idealism is and where it begins. In simplifying, let us say that either German idealism begins with Kant, or it begins after him, for instance in Reinhold, who was the first to reformulate the critical philosophy. If Kant and Hegel belong to German idealism, the relation of Hegel to Kant concerns two forms of idealism. If Hegel is an idealist and Kant is not, then the relation of Kant to Hegel opposes a form of idealism to the critical philosophy that is not idealist, but something else, which remains to be determined. In order to go further, it is necessary to describe idealism. If idealism concerns ideas, then the notorious theory of forms or ideas is a form of idealism and Plato is an idealist. Very early in the twentieth century, G. E. Moore claimed that idealism of all forms denies the existence of the external world. Since no idealist ever held such a view, this is only a philosophical joke, a kind of straw man. According to Engels, idealism inverts the relation between thought and being. Yet if idealism refers to the Copernican revolution, then its central insight concerns a constructivist epistemological strategy. Marx, who generally follows the constructivist approach, is, hence, an idealist in this sense. Constructivism presupposes a conception of the subject as basically active. The Marxian subject produces commodities, relations between human beings and things, as well as relations between human beings, and finally produces itself, the active subject in the social context that it constructs through its productive activity. Human history, from this perspective, culminates in human individuality. What is not possible in the capitalist phase of social evolution will finally become a real possibility in the communist phase. In producing themselves within the capitalist society that they produce, finite men and women arguably produce as well the transition from capitalism to communism, from the stage of prehistory to the stage of history that is finally human history. Human being constructs itself at the same time as it constructs products and human society. Marxian social ontology is supplemented by a constructivist approach to knowledge. We can only know the social world because we have so to speak constructed or again made . On this point, Marx follows Vico, who thinks the history is different from nature: since we do not make nature, we cannot know it; but since we make history, we can know it. In other words, to make and to know are two sides of human activity. Some consequences of a non-Marxist rereading of the relation of Marx to Hegel Marx is paradoxically both Hegelian and more than Hegelian. To understand Marx, one needs not only to know Hegel but to know Hegel well. Despite what is often said, it is false to believe in a rupture, a break or a simple discontinuity between Marx and Hegel, true to believe their relation can be described as what is sometimes referred to as continuity plus evolution (continuit avec ouverture). It would be mistaken to want to substitute Marx for Hegel, but also mistaken to isolate one from the other. A great thinker never leaves things in the state in which they were earlier. An important thinker always transforms the debate in rethinking the questions underway and even in raising other concerns for which one must seek other responses. But that does not mean that an important thinker leaves philosophy behind. Marx, who is a great thinker, one of the greatest modern thinkers, is also unclassifiable. Suffice it to say here that he does not only think in the path opened by Hegel. His philosophical thought also integrates ideas borrowed from other thinkers. In reacting to Hegel, in whose writings an adequate conception of the subject is supposedly lacking, Marx turns toward Fichte to appropriate an initial version of a conception of the subject as always active and never passive. The shadow of Engels, who invented Marxism, still weighs on the interpretation of the relation of Marx to Hegel, a relation that Engels is unable to comprehend because he does not have a sufficient grasp of Hegel. Yet when we reread the relation of Marx to Hegel differently, we understand Marx differently. Here are several examples, though I do not have the space to develop them in the detail they deserve. They concern: idealism and materialism, the phases of the evolution of Marx s thought, philosophy and economics or political economy; the Marxian method, and the so-called reflection theory. The distinction between materialism and idealism, which is often understood as the central distinction founding Marxism, is difficult. Suffice it to say that it does not concern a distinction between what is philosophy and what lies beyond it. Materialism is obviously a much discussed philosophical approach, for instance in the nineteenth century by Lange, a philosoophical approach going back to Greek antiquity. It is important to point out that Marx, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on the Difference between the Philosophy of Nature of Democritus and Epicurus is not a materialist in a way enabling us to draw a distinction between materialism and idealism. After Fichte, materialism is often understood as realism, but no idealist denies realism in adopting anti-realism or even irrealism. In other words, depending on how one understands idealism and materialism, they are arguably compatible and not incompatible. What about the controversial reflection theory (Widespiegelungstheorie)? This approach, which is not unique to Marxism, is adopted by F. Bacon, Wittgenstein and others, criticized by Rorty, and so on. Engels imports reflection theory into Marxism, where it was later empasized by Lenin. The reflection theory of knowledge, which is a form of representationalism, is difficult, indefensible. For it is not possible to know that a representation in fact represents without another, different access to what is supposedly represented. In other words, it is never possible to know that a supposed reflection in fact faithfully reflects its cognitive object. Further, Marx is, like Hegel, a resolutely historical thinker. Yet a theory of reflection is not historical but a-historical or even anti-historical. For there is not and cannot be a reflection of what changes. In any case, Marx, who does not subscribe to the theory of reflection, defends another approach. In the introduction to the Grundrisse, he comes very close to Hegel in insisting that knowledge does not derive from an immediate grasp of the given. The difficulty rather consists in constructing a conceptual framework to grasp the contents of experience on the conceptual level. This is a form of the idealist conception of identity. What is the relation between philosophy and economy or political economy in Marx? The answer is that a conception of Marxian economics or political economy is squarely based on the concept of the subject as active. Since this is a purely philosophical concept, it is not possible to find a fault line separating the young Marx from the older, more mature Marx. Underlying the differences between Marx s earlier and later writings is one and same basic conception. As he matured, Marx deepened and expanded a single vision. It is hence false to think that he began as a philosopher or on the basis of philosophical insights that he somehow later left behind, for instance in abandoning the concept of alienation presupposed by the theory of surplus value, and so on. I come now to my conclusion. The overall aim of this paper is to rethink the relation of Marx to Hegel in drawing some of the consequences of that rereading. The main result is to present a different view of German idealism, of Hegel, and, hence of the relation of Marx to Hegel and perhaps to Marxism as well. The main lesson can be summarized in terms Marx famously employs. Simply stated: the proletariat is not the grave digger of capitalism and Marx is not the grave digger of German idealism. If we reread the relation to Marx to Hegel from a non-Marxist perspective, we perceive that Marx is not anti-idealist. He is rather a German idealist, in fact the last great German idealist. 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